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Book Review Essay
What We Talk About When We
Talk About War
BARBARA STARK*

By Thomas Ehrlich and
Mary Ellen O'Connell. New York: Little, Brown and Co, 1993. 429
pages. 1
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE.

"Some vassal would come along and spear the bastard in
the name of love. Or whatever the fuck it was they fought
over in those days."
Raymond Carver 2

When we3 talk about war,4 we talk about the latest atrocity we saw on
the news or about the underlying political situation. We might even
* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. BA Cornell;J.D. NewYork
University; L.L.M. Columbia. I am grateful to Fran Ansley, Judy Cornett, Dorinda Dallmeyer,
Carol Parker, and Glenn Reynolds for their thoughtful comments, to the students in my
International Law and International Human Rights classes for their challenging questions, to
Darrel Menthe for an inspired edit, and to Katrina Bowman for her skill and patience in typing
the manuscript. This article benefitted greatly from the Conference on the Law of International
Organizations in Situations of Civil War, held at N.YU. School of Law, Jan. 1994, and I am
indebted to Tom Franck for inviting me. I presented ideas from this Essay at a Faculty Forum at
the University of Tennessee College of Law and I thank the participants for their comments. I
also acknowledge the generous support of the Institute for Law School Teaching, the Faculty
Development Programs of the University of Tennessee and the College of Law, the Lewis King
Krieg & Waldrop Fund and the Carden Research Fund. Jeffrey Grimes and Gabrielle Cowan
provided outstanding research assistance. This Essay is dedicated to Professor Louis Henkin and
Oscar Schachter, with my deep respect
1 THOMAS EHRLICH & MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE (1993) [hereinafter USE OF FORCE]. In addition to the main text, a collection of case
studies [hereinafter VOL III is available from the authors on Sub-Saharan Africa, the Persian Gulf
War (Iran vs. Iraq), the United States bombing of Libya, the United States invasion of Grenada,
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the conflict in
Ethiopia, and the Libyan intervention in Chad.
2 RAYMOND CARVER, Wat We Talk About Men We Talk About Love, in WHAT WE TALK
ABOUT WHEN WE TALKABOUT LOVE 137,149 (1981).
3 Carver's we specifically refers to two married couples. See Meredith Marsh, The Mutability
of the Heart NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 25, 1981, at 38, 39 ("For the most part, however, Carver writes
about ordinary people, bingo players and motel managers, rather than the highly introspective
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discuss our own personal experience with war. But we do not talk about
law. Even those of us who, as lawyers, habitually rely on legal frameworks
when we talk about money, sex, or death, rarely do so when we talk about
war.
Instead, we consider war part of "foreign policy," an esoteric branch
of politics best left to the President and his experts. 5 This reflects-and
reinforces-a profound cynicism. Americans who reject "might makes
right"6 at every level of domestic discourse, 7 take it for granted in connection with foreign affairs. We don't need to debate the law of war or
even ascertain what it is. Whatever is in the United States' best interest

we that the tide seems to promise."). Cf Robert Towers, Low-Rent Tragedies, N.Y. REV., May 14,
1981, at 37 ("Carver's people are not grotesque or notably eccentric, nor rascally or amusingly
loquacious .... Their ordinariness is unredeemed, their fMilures and fatalities are the sort that go
unnoticed . . . ."). Carver's we is also rhetorical, reaching out to introduce his "people" to a
broader community.
In this Essay, we refers to three nested communities. First, we are the small, transitory communities who meet in law school classrooms, where we get to know each other as both students
and teachers. Second, we are those in the broader legal community who are interested generally
in the law's ability to deter the use of force, or more specifically in law and literature or in
international law. Third, as in Carver's story, we is also a rhetorical device, used to reach out and
introduce the law of the use of force to a broader community.
For a similarly tortured treatment of the pronoun, see Brenda Cossman, Family Inside/Out,
44 U. TORONTO L.J. 2-3 n.4 (1994) (noting the tension between "false objectivism of the
detached author" and"universalistic" notions of identity and community).
4 Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits "the threat or use of force" rather than "war"
because "'[w]ar' has a technical (but imprecise) meaning in international law, and states often
engage in hostilities while denying that they-are [at] 'war."' MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (6th ed., 1987); see U.N. CHARTER art. 2,
4. As
Professor Damrosch has pointed out, Congress has insisted on "its Constitutional prerogatives
with respect to introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities, whether or not those hostilities are
denominated 'war'." Lori Fisler Damrosch, The ConstitutionalResponsibility of Congussfor Military
Engagements, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 58, 67 (1995).
5 Even a leader who believes in the rule of law may decline to bind himself by it. See, e.g.,
Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? ForeignAbduction AfterAlvarez-Machain, 45 STAN. L. REV.
939, 972 (1993) ("[T]o the chagrin of many international lawyers, even American leaders firmly
grounded in the tradition of legal-minded liberal internationalism, such as Woodrow Wilson,
Franklin Roosevelt, Henry Stimson, Jimmy Carter and Cyrus Vance, have willingly subordinated
international legal concerns to diplomatic objectives and domestic political realities.").
National security concerns have also been used to justify the removal of the use of force
from the public arena. But, as Theo Van Boven has pointed out:
It is a matter of the greatest concern that in most societies. . everything regarding research, development, production and trade of weapons is surrounded by walls of secrecy. The reasons for this are obvious, but this state of affairs does not make the world
a safe place. To a large extent, the vital issues of decision-making and the processes
leading to military build-up are withdrawn from effective democratic and public control.
Theo Van Boven, FundamentalRights and NuclearArms, 19 DEN.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y55, 65 (1990).
6 For a cogent collection of essays considering the "central contest between reason and
force," see LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., RIGHT V.MIGHT:. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE vii
(1st ed. 1989).. See also Letter from Sigmund Freud to Albert Einstein (1932) [hereinafter Why
War?] in EINSTEIN ON PEACE 191 (Otto Nathan & Heinz Norden eds., 1960); see generallyJOHN
KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WAR 79-136 (1993).
7 From the playground, see VIvIAN GUSSIN PALEY, YOU CAN'T SAYYOU CAN'T PLAY (1992),
to the White House. Whitewater: New Ground, N.Y TIMES,July 23, 1995, at E14 ("It is comforting
to learn that after the suicide of Vincent Foster ... someone in the Government recognized that
the White House was contaminating the investigation and had the integrity to say so.").
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will be the law.8 It may be true that, "[i]f law does not recognize power it
will be marginalized," 9 but if power does not recognize law it will be
despised.10
As Congress decided after Vietnam, war is too important to be left to
the Executive." Congress, however, cannot hold the Executive accountable, and the electorate cannot hold Congress accountable, without
coherent domestic debate. Such debate requires norms against which to
assess politics.12 Just as domestic law shapes as well as reflects norms on
violence between individuals,13 international law shapes and reflects
8 For an insightful critique of American "parochialism," see Mark W, Janis, International
Law?, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 363, 364-67 (1991). As the United States Supreme Court noted in
nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
1900, however, "[i]
by the courts ofjustice of appropriatejurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for their determination." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (190).
For .arecent confirmation that The Paquete Habana Court meant exactly what it said, see Jordan
Paust, Paquete and the President: Rediscovering the Brieffor the United States, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 982
(1994). But see Alfred P Rubin, Book Review, Human Rights and HumanitarianNorms as Customary
Law, 31 HARV. INT'LL.J. 685, 690 (finding "particularly bothersome" the commentator's reliance
on The Paquete Habanafor the proposition that customary human rights law is binding on U.S.
courts).
9 Bush, supranote 5, at 973. Professor Bush continues, "as international law has been for
much of this century." Id. Marginalized by whom? International law is ubiquitous, and its impact
he survey
is increasing along with the globalization of capital and the media, and as a result, "[t]
course in public international law is now offered in all but a very few law schools in the U.S. and
Canada." JOHN KING GAMBLE, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTHE 1990S, at 35 (1992). In his
survey of 150 teachers from 30 different countries outside of the United States and Canada,
Professor Gamble found that 65% of their institutions require an introductory course in public
international law. Id. at 72, 77.
10 The United States, for example, lost credibility in the global community when.it mined
the harbor in Nicaragua. See, e.g., GA Res. 43/11, in USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 262-63. The
supra note 1;
bombing of Libya met with similar reactions. See U.S. Bombing of Libya, in VOL. II,
RobertJ. Beck, InternationalLaw and the Decision to Invade Grenada:A Ten Year Retrospectiv4 33 VA. J.
INT'LL. 765 (1993).
11 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.CA §§ 1541-48 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter
WPR]. The WPR addresses the legality of "war," or "hostilities," as a matter of domestic law;
specifically, the President's obligation to report to Congress. For a brilliant and scholarly analysis,
see JOHN HART ELY WAR AND RESPONSIBILrIY CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFTERMATH (1993). Ten leading scholars in the fields of constitutional and foreign relations law
filed an amicus brief in Dellums v. Bush, 752 F Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990), askinf the Court to
affirm the Constitutional requirement "that Congress be meaningfully consulted. Id. (rprinted
in 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 257 (1991)) (citing Damrosch, supra note 4, at 60 n.14). But see Major
Michael P. Kelly, Fixing the War Powers, 141 MEL. L. REV. 83 (1993) (urging the repeal of the WPR);
Mark T. Uyeda, Note, PreidentialPrerogative Under the Constitution to Deploy U.S. Military Forces in
Low-Intensity Conflict, 44 DuKE L.J. 777 (1995) (arguing that presidential prerogative is consistent
with original intent, historical and customary use of force, and has been condoned by the courts).
Support for the WPR in general has not saved it from criticism in connection with particular
weaknesses, such as its failure to provide clear guidelines. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Rethinking
War Powers: By Law or By "Thaumaturgic Invocation"? 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 766 (1989); see genera/ly
Symposium, The United States Constitution in its Third Century: ForeignAffairs, 83 AM.J. INT'L L.713
(19g9).
12 This does not preclude using political norms to assess law, nor does it necessarily privilege 'either law or politics. For insightful and profoundly humanistic explorations of the
problems raised by both, see generally THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David
Kairys ed., 1982). See generally ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY & LAW 1 (positing that law in
liberal societies appears "in some fundamental sense morally unproblematic").
13 Murder, for example, is a criminal offense in every state, although its specific definition
varies. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, R., CRIMINAL LAW 607 (2d ed. 1986). Battery, the
"unlawful application of force to the person o another," is similarly a universal offense, although
it is slightly more problematic because what is "unlawful" varies: under the Model Penal Code,
for example, sexual crimes are covered in other statutes. Id. at 684-85.
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norms of violence between states. 14 The recent text by Thomas Ehrlich
and Mary Ellen O'Connell, InternationalLaw and the Use of Force (" Use of
Force") explains these norms, the rules which embody them, and the
processes through which states enforce, violate, and change them. Use of
Force enables us to talk about law when we talk about war.15
It does so by effectively grappling with three critical problems. First,
it addresses the question of identity, or what Pierre Schlag has referred to
as "the problem of the subject." 16 Who actually makes the law in this
context? What is the source of their normative authority? Second, the
authors frankly discuss the conceptual limits, as well as the practical gaps;
in the law on the use of force, what I will refer to as its "negative space."1 7
I draw on Raymond Carver's short story, What We Talk About When We
Talk About Love ("What We Talk About")18 because it grapples with, and
illuminates, similar problems of identity, "negative space," and rhetoric.
Like the authors, Carver understands that answers are shaped by who
asks the questions; how open, indeterminate and even unanswerable the
questions may be; how rhetoric can bridge the gaps, and why everyone
affected should join in the rhetoric-building process. In What We Talk
About, Carver's characters are trying to "talk about love." Gradually,
uncomfortably, they realize how hard it is for them to do so, in part
because there is no metanarrative, no "grand story,"19 that resonates for

14 USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 3 ("A primary thesis of these materials is that law can and
should have an impact on decision-making concerning vital issues of war and peace, just as on
decision-making relating to major questions on the domestic scene.").
15 Few law schools offer courses on the law on the use of force, USE OF FORCE, supra note 1,

at 4, and this text is intended either to make it easier to do so or to supplement public international law classes. The authors note that they have used it with students who have no background
in international law, and even with political science students who have no background in any
kind of law. Use of Force is an accessible introduction to international law for students who might
otherwise never be exposed to the subject in law school. But see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA. THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT xxv (1989)

("[T]here is a tension between [themes relating to war, human rights and international
organization] and the rest of the law.").
16 Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV 1627 (1991); see alsoJ.M. Balkin,
UnderstandingLegal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE LJ.
105 (1993).
17 For example, U.N. member states have never provided the agreed upon troops under
article 43 of the U.N. Charter. The United States is unlikely to do so at this point. See, e.g.,
Richard Hartzman, Legislation to Restrict U.S. Involvement in United Nations Peacekeeping Moving
ThioulT Congress, ASIL NEWSL., March-May 1995, at 8. President Clinton has restricted U.S.
participation in collective security operations and said that "the United States does not support a
standing U.N. army." Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., New Isolationists Weaken America, N.Y TIMES, June 11,
1995, at E15. The authors suggest that a U.N. force, "available against all aggressors, including
permanent members of the Security Council," must be created. USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at
247; accord Brian Urquhart, Whose Fight Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1994, at A15 (urging the
creation of a "small, elite, permanent U.N. force composed of volunteers").
18 CARVER, supra note 2. For more essays on the usefulness of stories for the legal community, see NARRATIVE AND LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER INSTORYTELLING AND THE LAW (David R.
Papke ed., 1991), and Symposium, Pedagogy of Narrative, 40J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990); see also
THEODOR MERON, HENRY'S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAWS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAW OF WAR

INTHE LATER MIDDLE AGES (1994) (using literature to illuminate an analysis of the laws of war).
19 "Metanarrative" is used by postmodernists to describe and distinguish the disconnected,
"little" stories of "postmodernism" from the totalizing descriptions or theories of modernism.
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them all. If there is going to be a story, it is going to be a small one
("petit-narrative"), and they will have to write it themselves. Use of Force,
which includes materials for a series of in-class exercises, 20 leads students
through a similar process to a similarly rich, if disquieting, understanding.
This essay also draws on law school experience, including my own
and that of my students, with role-playing, problem-solving and experiential learning exercises taken from Use of Force. I conclude by drawing
on recent psychoanalytic work on war to explain why these exercises
were so effective and at the same time so frustrating, and why it was so
important for them to be both.
I. IDENTITY

A. In Carver's Story
Carver's story opens with two couples deciding where to go for dinner: "[S]itting around the kitchen table drinking ....The gin and the
tonic water kept going around, and we somehow got on the subject of
love." 2 1 Carver's narrator is credible, sympathetic but objective. While
he sees himself primarily as an observer, he is also a participant. Carver
reminds us that stories are always told by human subjects, whether they
are visible within the story or hiding outside of it.
The dominant voice in the story is not the narrator's, however. The
reader is told in the first line: "My friend Mel McGinnis was talking. Mel
McGinnis is a cardiologist, and sometimes that gives him the right."22
The understated sarcasm undermines Mel's authority. Why does his
profession give him a "right" to talk, to be heard, about anything besides
cardiology?23 Perhaps Mel thinks his "right" arises from his money, or his
own sense of importance, but the other couple and his wife concede that
"right" grudgingly. They let him talk, but they do not let him talk for
them. They will listen as long as he can hold their interest, but he has no
normative authority. 24

For a general introduction to narrative, see ROBERT SCHOLES & ROBERT KELLOGG, THE

NATURE OF NARRATIVE 4 (1966) ("For writing to be narrative no more and no less than a teller

and a tale are required."). For a comprehensive overview, see James R. Elkins, A Bibliography of
Narrative,40J. LEGAL EDUc. 203 (1990).
20 SeeVOL. II, supranote 1.
21 CARvER, supra note 2, at 137.
22 Id

23 Indeed, he later gently mocks himself, only to be furiously outdone by his wife. Id. at
149.
24 See Roger C. Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37J. LEGAL EDUC. 509, 514 (1987)
[hereinafter Beyond the OrdinaryReligion] ("He who claims to have 'the truth' is a person, we have
learned, to be feared, unless with genuine humility he is willing to expose his truth to the data,
arguments, and experience of others.").
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Mel's identity shapes his narrative, just as his narrative reveals who he
really is.25 Mel yearns for a universal standard with which to measure
love. He is convinced that he has found a paradigm in an old couple's
faithfulness. Their story,2 6 he believes, will "make us ashamed that we
think we know what we're talking about when we talk about love." 27 The
premium he puts on faithfulness shows us how hard it is for him to be
faithful and how hard it is for him to have faith. 28 He questions his
attachment to his second wife, Terri, and wonders whether he would be
more attached if he were instead married to Laura, the narrator's wife.29
He not only questions the integrity and constancy of his own feelings,
30
but whether love itself can ever be absolute.
Terri, Mel's wife, disagrees. She insists that because "people are different" 31 love cannot be measured by universal, objective standards. She
describes how "the man she lived with before she lived with Mel loved
her so much he tried to kill her."3 2 Unlike her doubting husband, Terri
is certain that love is subjective, and defies Mel to prove her wrong.
Terri's story is a story of victimhood, of powerlessness. She nevertheless insists on the validity of her own subjective experience and her
autonomy, her "right," to set her own normative standards based on that
experience. Mel, in contrast, seeks a universal standard which he
assumes will incorporate and legitimate his perspective.3 3 At the same
time, he recognizes the costs of too much power,, the risks of too many
choices. He also seeks a universal standard to save him from his own
doubts, his own internal conflicts.

25 As philosopher Charles Taylor explains, "My identity is defined by the commitments and
identifications which provide the frame of horizon within which I can try to determine from case
to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In
other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand." CHARLES TAYLOR,
SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTrY 27 (1989).

26 Mel does not know their story, and the reader never hears it. See infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
27 CARVER, supranote 2, at 146.

28 See id. at 137-38 ("He said he'd spent five years in a seminary before quitting to go to
medical school. He said he still looked back on those -years in the seminary as the most
important years in his life.").
29 Id. at 150-51.

30 Id. at 144 ("There was a time when I thought I loved my first wife more than life itself.
But now I hate her guts. I do. How do you explain that? What happened to that love?").
31 Id. at 138.

32 Id. Terri continues, "He beat me up one night. He dragged me around the living room
by my ankles. He kept saying, 'I love you, I love you, you bitch.' Hfe went on dragging me around
the living room. My head kept knocking on things." Id.
33 Like the "subjects" described by Professors Schlag and Balkin, supranote 16, Mel takes it
for granted that his point of view will be represented, whether because he will participate in
crafting such a standard or simply because it is "right." Because Terni, unlike these subjects, has
been and probably still is subordinated, she assumes that her point of view will not be represented.
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B. In the Law School Classroom
1. The Text
Use of Force tells us that nation states are the subjects, the narrators,
the we, of the law on the use of force.3 4 The major world powers resolved
to create law to govern the use of force in horrified response to the mass
destruction of World War 11.35 The post-World War I attempt to create a
legal regime had failed, 36 but the new regime would have more
"muscle."37

Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force by a state
against any other state.3 8 The only exception is "self-defense." 39 What
amounts to a "use of force"?40 What is the appropriate scope of selfdefense? 41 Like Carver, the authors of Use of Force recognize that the
subjects shape the story. Since states are the only subjects in the discourse on the use of force, 42 the rhetoric on the use of force is appropri34 KOSKENNIEMI, supranote 15, at xxiii ("We don't choose the concepts of international law

when we enter international legal discourse. Rather, we must take a preexisting language, a
preexisting system of interpreting the world and move within it if we wish to be heard and
understood.").
35 USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 205. It has been argued that the justice at Nuremberg

was "victors' justice"; that is, that the "crimes against humanity" for which the Nazis were
convicted were not "crimes" until the Germans and the Japanese lost the war. See, e.g., Max
Frankel, The War and the Law, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 7, 1995, at 48. This argument was in fact
raised and rejected at Nuremberg. Jonathan A. Bush, Nurmberg: The Modern Law of War and Its
Limitations, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 2022, 2035 (1993) (reviewing TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR); See also Morris B. Abram, Chair, U.N. Watch,
Letter to the Editor, N.Y TIMES, May 21, 1995 ("[If we await perfect justice, none will ever be
meted out. Until a world government is established with a le islature and judiciary, what would
Frankel want allied powers in World War II and the U.N. toy to o with captured monsters?
Shoot them on the spot? Turn them loose? Try them by set rules in an open court'").
36 The League of Nations was the "first global attempt to restrict by law the rights of states
to wage war." USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 205.
37 The U.N. Charter has more textual "muscle" than the Covenant of the League of Nations because it prohibits the use of force, while the Covenant's "pious, if limited, restrictions on
the use of force.., were not matched by the development of procedures and methods to make
them effective." Id. at 205-06. The Charter regime has more political "muscle," not only because
the United States is a member, but because the Security Council (which had no analog under the
Covenant regime) "was allocated greater powers than any other international entity in history."
Id at 207.
38 "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 14.
39 U.N. CHARrER arts. 51, 52. This includes "collective self-defense"; that is, other states
may come to the aid of a victim state which has requested aid.
40 At what point does "nuclear preparedness," for example, amount to a use of force?
Some have suggested that if a state is reasonably convinced that it is going to be attacked, it can
pre-emptively "respond." As Professor Henkin notes, "Fortunately... the' issue has remained
academic." USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 343.
41 What "self" has the state? See genrally SUSAN GRIFFIN, A CHORUS OF STONES: THE
PRIVATE LIFE OF WAR 278 (1993) ("The identity crisis they are talking about is probably one of
national boundaries. But of course there are other identities placed in jeopardy now, such as the
identity of the warrior.").
42 'As Professor Henkin has summarized: "[E]ntities other than states had no status, no
rights, duties or remedies, no claim to membership in international organizations, no standing
before international bodies." ASIL NEWSL., Nov. - Dec. 1993, at 1, 3. Indeed, states are still the
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ately "stately"; that is, grand and abstract. States, for example, lose
"troops"; they do not lose husbands and fathers, sons and daughters.
Just as human interests shape Carver's story, state interests shape the
narrative on the use of force. 43 Under pre-Charter international law, for
example, if civil war erupted other states were only allowed to support
the already-recognized government, not a rebellious faction. 44 Sovereign
states had a clear self-interest in preserving the stability of other sovereign states.
The pre-Charter law was challenged, however, by states that had formerly been colonial territories. In the colonial context, aiding the
already-recognized government was tantamount to support for the
continuing oppression of colonized people. A new norm of "selfdetermination" gradually emerged. 45 This, too, reflects the self-interest
of "states," but it incorporates the perspectives of new states as well as
their colonizing predecessors. 46 Through carefully selected and edited
law of non-intervention in
excerpts, Use of Force explains how "a new
47
internal affairs" replaced pre-Charter law.
While sovereign states are "equal," some states are more equal than
others. Just as Mel dominates the conversation in Carver's story, the
United States dominates the conversation internationally as the only
remaining superpower. 48 Without United States support, U.N. military
operations become impossible. 49 When the United States speaks, other
only parties who may appear before the International Court of Justice. STAT. I.CJ., art. 34.1,June

26, 1945, TS. No. 993, 3 BEVANS 1153, 1179. For a forceful argument that "obligations and
entitlements are no longer the sole attributes of states but first and foremost pertain to human

beings and to people," see Van Boven, supra note 5, at 58.
43 Although states are obviously represented by a changing cast of human actors, the states
themselves remain the subjects and states have their own set of interests. Thomas Ehrlich
suggests that the use of force is a "testing case for the legal process in decisionmaking on U.S.
foreign policy." A Testing Case, in USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 137.
44 David J. Scheffer, The Gmat Debate of the 1980s, in USE OF FORCE, su a note 1, at 114
("The sides may become so balanced that to call one a government and another an insurgency
would be patently unresponsive to the facts. The classical rule is that no one may aid either side
in a civil war."); see also Thomas Ehrlich, MeasuringLine of Occasion, in USE OF FORCE, supra note 1,
at 129 (urging "modification of traditionalist positions to make the law more realistic and thus
perhaps more effective").
45 For an illuminating discussion of self-determination, see Martti Koskenniemi, National
Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory andPractice,43 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 241 (1994).
46 But see Louis Henkin, The Use o Force:Law and United StatesPolicy, in USE OF FORCE, supra
note 1, at 340, 341 [hereinafter Henkin, The Use of Force] ("With colonialism no longer an
important concern, the pressure for a 'self-determination exception' to the law of the Charter has
subsided.").
47 This can be understood as "an attempt to limit outside neo-colonial attempts to influence events in other countries." Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legality of Military Intervention by the
Invitation of the Government, in USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 366, 367; Ruth Gordon, United
Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519 (1994)
(analyzing multilateral intervention under U.N. auspices).
48 Just as Mel provides the gin, the United States provides the arms and what is widely recognized as the best-trained and best-equipped fighting force in the world.
49 See generally USE OF FORCE, supranote 1,at 216-39; see also Bryan Hall, Blue Helmets, Empty
Guns, N.Y TMES MAG.,Jan. 2, 1994, at 18 (summarizing the problems confronting 72,000 U.N.
soldiers involved in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Rwanda, Haiti, the former Yugoslavia,
and elsewhere throughout the world).
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states pay attention, although they do not necessarily agree. Like Mel,
the United States lacks normative authority.50 Its wealth and power, or its
own sense of importance, may lead some in this country to think it "has a
right," but other states concede that right grudgingly. They do not
recognize wealth and power as a legitimate source of normative authority. Some states resent and contest American claims to the contrary, just
as Mel's companions resent and contest his.
Like Mel, the United States has an interest in a universal standard,
which it assumes will incorporate and legitimate American perspectives.
For example, some American commentators argue that "humanitarian
intervention" should be recognized as a legitimate exception to the
Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force. John Norton Moore proposes specific standards for evaluating the legitimacy of such intervention. 51
Other states are concerned that the United States might find it difficult to be faithful to such standards, especially in view of the many
opportunities for stretching them. As British scholar Ian Brownlie notes,
under Professor Moore's standards, "[T]he opportunities for intervention will be very many. It is also the case that only a few powerful states
will have a choice of voluntary intervention of this kind."52 Richard
Lillich counters with a "plea for constructive alternatives."53 Use of Force
concludes this discussion with an excerpt from Louis Henkin's Right v.
Might. "At bottom, all suggestions for exceptions to Article 2(4) imply
that, contrary to the assumptions of the Charter's framers, there are
universally recognized values higher than peace and the autonomy of
states. In general, the claims of peace and state autonomy have prevailed." 54 While Use of Force does not explicitly endorse Professor Henkin's view, the range and vigor of these excerpts show that no other
values have achieved the acceptance accorded "peace" and "state autonomy."55 Much like Mel, many American commentators are deeply drawn
to simpler, less conflicted paradigms. They are drawn to these simpler
paradigms either to support American interests (which some conflate
with world interests) 56 or to bind the United States, to protect us from
50 Some of the materials suggest that U.S. failure to comply with international law has undermined the normative authority the United States once enjoyed. See supra note 10. The
authors include arguments to the contrary, however, such as the excerpt from Anthony Clark
Arend noting violations by over 100 states of the Article 2(4) prohibition. USE OF FORCE, supra
note 1, at 200, 201.
51 USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 331. For a provocative, but ultimately unpersuasive argument that human rights violations constitute "threats to the peace" sufficient to trigger
Charter-endorsed "coercive action," see W. Michael Reisman, Haiti and the Validity of International
Action, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 82, 83 (1995).
52 Ian Brownlie, HumanitarianIntervention, in USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 327, 332.
53 Richard Lillich, HumanitarianIntervention:A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Pleafor Constructive Alternatives, in USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 333, 337-38 (finding no support for Brownlie's
preference for U.N. intervention "in the events of the past decade").
54 USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 342.
55 Not even "democracy" has achieved the same degree of acceptance, although the rhetoric is increasingly robust. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Democratic Entitlement, 29 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1 (1994).
56 See, e.g., Scheffer, supranote 44, at 118 (describing views of the "allied school"):
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the consequences of our own political vagaries. The law on the use of
force, however, neither provides such paradigms nor permits the United
States (or any other state) to unilaterally establish them.
Instead, in deference to state autonomy, the law on the use of force
leaves it to the victim state to "declare itself to have been the object of an
57
armed attack" and to "request... assistance in collective self-defense."
Like Terri, victim states remain the arbiters of their own experience.8
They remain autonomous 5 9 and retain the right to set their own normative standards based on that experience. Richer and more powerful
states, like Mel, cannot unilaterally impose some ostensibly objective
standard.60
2. The Students
Unlike both Carver's story and the law on the use of force, the law
school classroom is usually dominated by one voice, whose authority is
accepted, if not always unquestioned. It belongs to the law school
professor, and unlike Mel and the United States, he 6l often enjoys
Like the United States Constitution, the Charter is an ever-expanding document that

must respond to a rapidly changing world, one where the collective security arrangement of the immediate post-World War II era has collapsed:... That means revising
international law so that it remains compatible with the foreign policy objectives of the
United States and its allies.
57 Henkin, The Use of Force, supra note 46, at 340, 344 (citing the International Court of
Justice in the Nicaraguacase). As David Scheffer explains, "traditionalists argue that a third stbte

may have the right to counterintervene to protect the independence and territorial integrity of
the 'invaded' country, provided that it is exercised in collective self-defense in a manner faithful

to the procedural framework of Article 51 of the United Nation's Charter." Scheffer, supra note
44, at 114-15.
58 The determination of the victim state remains subject to judicial review, however, as
Lauterpachet argued and the Nuremberg Trials confirmed. USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 25152.
59 The price of this autonomy may well be further victimization, as it may be for Terri.
60 The implication that the relations between developed and developing states in the context of the use-of-force regime are gendered is intentional. Because this is not addressed in USE
OF FORCE, unfortunately, I merely note it here. This may be considered part of the text's
"negative space," however, and those wishing to supplement it should see Judith Gail Gardham,
The Law of Armed Conflict: A Gendered Regime?, in RECONCEIVING REAL1Ty. WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993) [hereinafter RECONCEMNG REALrnY]; Christine
M. Chinkin, Peace andForce in InternationalLa in id. at 203. See infra Part III.
This is, of course, a specific application of a very old theme. For a still powerful introduction, see VIRGINIA WOOLF, THREE GUINEAS (1938). I am not suggesting that women are
inherently less bellicose than men. Rather, peace-making and reconciliation skills, like nurturing
skills in general, are culturally attributed to women and women are expected to promote them.
See, e.g., Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and the Law: Feminist Jurispnudenc 12 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 25 (1989).
61 The use of the masculine pronoun here is deliberate. See Catharine W. Hantzis,
Kingsfield and Kennedy: Reappraisingthe Male Models of Law School Teaching,38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155,
156 (1988):
For many students, [Kingsfield's] central place in the popular conception of legal education legitimates his classroom style and renders marginal and suspect efforts by others to adopt different instructional techniques. The problem this poses for many
thoughtful law school teachers is especially acute for women because the Kingsfield image is so exclusively male. Ifa man who resembles Kingsfield leaves a student confused
and suffering from low self-esteem, that is to be expected. If, on the other hand, a
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normative authority. A few brave students may question doctrine, and
many more may question their own understanding of it, but they rarely
question the professor's authority to say what it is.62 The. professor's
authority is based on, even as it confirms, the normative authority of
63
domestic law.

Law students understand that the normative authority of the law can
be challenged, of course, but they soon learn that such challenges must
be supported by statutory authority or common law precedent, precisely
drafted 64 and carefully directed to the appropriate branch of government.65 A law professor knows where such challenges are most likely to
arise and how the system deals with them. When he lectures about
domestic doctrine, citing legislative history on the scope of the statute,
quoting appellate court opinions on the law and trial court decisions on
the facts, he replicates the process of domestic law. The law professor is
like a cardiologist talking about the human heart during surgery, or
discussing surgery he has done in the past.
A law teacher lecturing about the law on the use of force is more like
Mel, more like a cardiologist talking about love. International law
governs the use of force between states, just as domestic law governs the
use of force between individuals, but in striking contrast to domestic law,
international law is applied and interpreted by the parties themselves.
As Professor Henkin has noted, "International law is made by the states
themselves, not by a legislative body representing them. It is made by
'unanimity', not by majority votes. Under traditional principles, a state is
bound only by law to which it has itself consented." 66 Until and unless
the Security Council finds a threat to -"international peace and security,"67 the resolution of a particular conflict is left to the states involved.,
Role-playing exercises, in which students assume the roles of various
states, replicate the diffusion of normative authority and the need for
consensus which characterize the law on the use of force. 68 In addition,
woman teacher fails to make confusing material crystal clear, the student's confusion is
the result of herbad teaching.
62 Indeed, students are far more likely to challenge the professor's rfusal to say what it is,
to construe such refusal as "hiding the ball."
63 "All teaching, if it is worth anything, involves transmitting values: students learn from
professors and professors learn from students. The .ransmission is rarely an equal interchange,
however, because students look to the professor as the classroom authority on all issues, including
the value of class contributions." Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to
EnsureFullClass Participation,38J. LEGAL EDUC. 147, 148-149 (1988).
64 This "precise drafting" often requires particular legal "terms of art"; i.e., a formal, explicitly agreed-upon language. See,e.g., RICHARD WYDIC, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS 19 (3d ed.
1994).
65 How many student challenges, for example, are countered by a professorial query, "Isn't

that a question for the legislature?"
66 LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS, VALUES AND FUNCrIONS 45-46 (1990)
(cited in USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 174).

67 For a thoughtful analysis of the post-Cold War revival of the U.N. Security Council, see
Jose E. Alvarez, The Once andFuture Security Council,WASH. Q., Spring 1995, at 5.

68 It also redistributes responsibility. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Mad Midwifery:
Bringing Theory, Doctrine, and Practiceto Life, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1977, 1986 (1993) (describing the
value of moot courts and role-playing in the classroom: "Short of actual client representation,
nothing focuses a student's attention like the eye of the camera, a well-prepared opposing
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role-playing enables students to explore state identity from the "inside."
What shapes state identity? The case studies contained in Volume II allow
students to explore a wide range of political, geo-political and historical
factors which have produced various hot-spots throughout the world, as
well as to distinguish state identity from "American" identity. Through
role-playing, students discover how self-interest shapes state narratives.
Which states want to strengthen the Charter paradigm and which seek to
challenge it? Which state dominates the conversation? Why do the
others allow it to do so? Finally, as Stephanie Wildman has pointed out,
role-playing allows students to forget themselves and their anxieties
about their performance in law school, freeing them to explore these
69
questions creatively.
Role-playing exercises challenge teachers as well as students. Many
law teachers are more comfortable guiding students toward what we
70
know is the "right" answer than allowing them to grope for their own.
Even if the teacher can shed his role, moreover, teacher-participation in

the role-playing exercise may make it harder for students to shed theirs.
By instead assuming a passive role, a law teacher can give students room
to play more active roles.7 1 Even students' occasional panic can be
instructive. States, too (or at least the humans who represent them) may

panic when thrust into situations for which they are unprepared, situations for which there may in fact be no precedent.

II.

"NEGATIVE SPACE"

A. In Carver'sStory
Carver's story depends on negative space, on who is not speaking, on

counsel, and the scrutiny of a judge'."); see generally Paul Bergman et al.,
Learning From Experience:
Nonlegally-Specfic Role Plays, 37J. LEGAL EDUC. 535 (1987).
69 Professor Wildman suggests "encouraging [a student afraid to ask a question] to forget
herself and play a role-for example, 'What would you argue if you were defendant's lawyer?"'
Wildman, supranote 63, at 151-52. For a description of simulation exercises used to encourage
students to "place less stock in lawyerly constructions," see Charles Lawrence, III, The Word and the
River: Pedagogy As Scholarship As Strugge, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2244-47 (1992). Mary Marsh
Zulack has described how clinical students have worked with representatives of community
groups and studied the groups' decision-making processes. This suggests a useful focus for roleplaying in the international context as well. Mary Marsh Zulack, Rediscovering Client DecisionMaking: The Impact ofRole-Playing, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 593, 602-03 (1995).
70 . he silence that ends Carver's story, moreover, is the last thing most law teachers want in
the classroom.
71 My role has been more what Peter Shane has described as "provocateur." Peter M.
Shane, Prophetsand Provocateurs,37J. LEGAL EDUC. 529, 531 (1987) ("The role I, therefore, prefer
to play is one of provocateur, not prophet. I share Cramton's commitment to bringing to the
surface the value presuppositions of the law, whether tacit or explicit, and inviting students to
compare those presumptions to their own.") I pass notes to the participants, sometimes to "level
the playing field," sometimes to destablize an improbable settement. Once or twice, a last
minute absence has prompted me to assume a role. This changes the balance of power in the
exercise. Students are understandably more alert and receptive to my reaction or comments as
"teacher" than as "state."
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what is not said and what cannot be said:72 "In Carver there is a prevailing absence, a silence, an empty space between the lines that the text
invites us to fill."73 The characters have no story-not even a "boy meets
girl" petit-narrative-to give shape to their inchoate feelings; they have
no agreed-upon narrative framework to structure their thoughts. It is
not even clear whether they have enough in common to construct such a
framework. These characters are neither bound nor supported by the
metanarrative of any foundational belief system. 74 At the end of What We
Talk About, they sit in the dark silently, the gin bottle empty, listening to
their own "human noise": "I could hear my heart beating, I could hear
everyone's heart. I could hear the human noise we sat there making, not
7
one of us moving, not even when the room went dark." 5
Mel thinks that long ago it was different. Knights and ladies lived
within a metanarrative that protected them like armor, like their castle
walls. Rhetoric, the art of persuasion, 76 flourished within that metanarrative, and bought order and grace to messy human relations. The
rhetoric of courtly love, for example, made romantic love possible and
gave dignity and meaning to loss and renunciation. Although Mel
understands that the rhetoric flourished within a brutal feudal system to
which few would willingly return, he continues to marvel at it and
77
proffers a postmodern iteration.
Mel's paradigm of human love-an old couple in the hospital after a
car accident-epitomizes negative space. 78 Because both old people lie
completely encased in casts, he does not even know what they look like;
they are so badly injured that only one of them speaks. The husband is
inconsolable because he cannot see his wife:

72 Henry Moore's sculpture, for example, is famous for its negative space, which is often
the focus: "Because I was trying to become conscious of spaces in the sculpture-I made the hole
have a shape in its own right... sometimes the form was only the shell holding the hole." PHILIP
JAMES& HENRYMOORE, HENRYMOORE ON SCULPTURE 118 (1966).
73 RANDOLPH PAUL RUNYON, READING RAYMOND CARVER (1992).
74 Professor Williams has described a "[niew epistemology, consist[ing] of a broad and
diverse intellectual movement that rejects a range of long-standing Western verities .... Perhaps
the core element of the new epistemology is its rejection of an absolute truth accessible through
vigorous, logical manipulation of abstractions." Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gende, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 797, 80 (1989).
75 CARVER, supranote 2, at 154.
76 James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Culturaland CommunalLife,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 (1985) (citing Gorgias, the ancient rhetorician, who defined rhetoric
"as the art of persuading the people about matters ofjustice and injustice in the public places of
the state").
77 This is a wonderful example of Derrida's aphorism, "iterability alters," which, as Professor Balkin has explained, "is a shorthand way of saying that once the signifier leaves the author's
creation and is let loose upon the world, it takes on a life of its own in the other contexts in which
it can be repeated." J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 743, 772-77
(1987).
78 Runyon notes the evolution from the knight's armor to the old couple's casts. RUNYON,
supra note 73, at 133. Indeed, this old couple is almost a parody of the courtly tradition. It is not
parody, however, because it is "devoid of irony." See infra note 152 and accompanying text
(describing "pastiche").
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Even after he found out that his wife was going to pull through,
he was still very depressed. Not about the accident, though...
because he couldn t see her through his eye hole .... Can you
imagine? I'm telling you, the man's heart was breaking because
he couldn't turn his god damn head and see his god damn wife.79
The old woman is never heard, and the brief quote about the old
man, despite Mel's energetic insistence; is ambiguous. Mel's story fails as
rhetoric, the "art of persuasion," since his wife and friends remain
skeptical. 80 It is not easy to "talk about love," to find rhetoric that
resonates with disparate experiences and values. 8 1
Carver shows how Mel's frustration shapes his initial efforts. It is precisely the roughness of these efforts, however, and the resultant awkward
gaps, that invite others to contribute their own stories. Mel's relationship with the others is like Carver's relationship with his readers. As one
critic has described it, Carver "teases us into a collaboration." 82 The
silence in which the story ends offers the reader "negative space" in
which to consider her own story, the rhetoric from which it is constructed, and the metanarrative of which it is (or is not) a part.
B. In the Law School Classroom
1. The Text
The law on the use of force is also shaped by its negative space-who
is not speaking, what is not said, and what cannot be said. Since states
alone are the subjects, there are no "human voices" in the law on the use
of force. The language of this law does not reflect the human experience of war.85 Instead, it distances war, surveying war from a state, rather
than a human, perspective.8 4

79 CARVER, supranote 2, at 151.
80 What makes the old man's obsession any truer or better than that of Ed, Terri's former
lover, who "loved her so much he tried to kill her"? See CARVER, supranote 2, at 138.
81 Cf GRIFFIN, supra note 41, at 46 ("[I]t may be that what we have to tell is something no
one wants to know because what we say does not fit into the scheme of things as they are
understood to be.").
82 SUSAN LOHAFER, COMING TO TERMS WITH THE SHORT STORY65 (1983).
83 As the authors note in their introduction, "the rules governing armed conflict fall into
two broad categories: Those concerning how armed conflict is conducted and those relating to
when force may be used." Use ofForce is explicitly limited to the second category. Law governing
the first category, the conduct of armed conflict, reflects more of the human experience of war
because it includes the law governing the treatment of civilians and enemy prisoners. See Chris af
Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War 35
HARV.INT'L L. J.49, 54-55 (1994).
84 For descriptions of the often surreal result, see GRIFFIN, supra note 41, at 46. This is
consistent with the notion that violations of human rights do not overcome the Charter
prohibition. This does not mean that other states cannot respond to violations of human rights,
genocide, or any other "use of force" by a state against its own people. Use of Force devotes a
section to actions short of force, USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 268-304, including sanctions and
exclusion from international regimes, to influence the behavior of offending states.

1996

What We Talk About When We Talk About War

As in Carver's story, there is no agreed-upon rhetorical framework for
the law on the use of force. The Charter was drafted to promote international 85peace, but it provides no definition, no positive conception of
"peace."
Rather, under the Charter the states simply agree to agree.
Under Article 43, for example, the states agree to "undertake to make
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities." 86
The contemplated agreements have never been drafted.87 Such agreements would have required the states to generate rhetorical frameworks,
not only to reconcile the broad mandate of the Charter with domestic
law and to reassure domestic constituencies, but to clarify the terms
"armed forces," "assistance," and "facilities." As the recent carnage in
Rwanda has demonstrated, the mere absence of the use of force by one
state against another is not enough to ensure "peace."
Finally, like Carver's story, the Charter regime is not grounded in any
foundational belief system; it refers to no larger, coherent "story." There
is no metanarrative. 88 The only values promoted by the law on the use of
force are "peace" and "state autonomy."89 It is not easy to talk about
"peace," to generate rhetoric that resonates with the disparate experiences and values of the more than 185 member states of the United

Use of Force also discusses "humanitarian intervention" and "massive violations of human
rights," concepts which refer to human subjects. As exceptions to the use-of-force regime,
however, these present great risks. As Professor Henkin has pointed out, the temptation for a
state to intervene to further its own interests, using "humanitarian intervention" or "massive
violations of human rights" as an excuse, may well present greater threats to international peace
and security than the violations which initiallyjustify such intervention. Whether multilateralism
might reduce such threats-and whether the international community has the political will for
such multilateralism-remain open questions. The international community is unlikely to "have
the will" unless the United States supports it, however, and the United States is unlikely to support
it unless there is domestic consensus. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14 (discussing how
consensus depends on debate).
The relationship between human rights and the law on the use of force remains unclear.
Professor Henkin has noted the interdependence of human rights and peace. See, e.g., Louis
Henkin, GetrLecture:Law and OnerAjier the Cold War, 15 MD. INT'L L. & TRADE 147,167(1991).
For collections of essays exploring this interrelation in the contexts of nuclear weapons and
environmental rights, respectively, see generally Symposium, Nuclear Weapons and the Right to
Survival, Peace and Developmen4 19 DEN. . INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1990); Symposium, Environmental
Rights andInternationalPeace, 59 TENN. . REv. 651 (1992).
85 See generaly APPROACHES TO PEACE: AN INTELLECrUAL MAP (W. Scott Thompson et al.
eds., 1991); see also Ann Fagan Ginger, FindingPeaceLaw and TeachingIt, 10 NOVA LJ. 521 (1986).
For an in-depth proposal for post-Cold War reforms of the United Nations, see Robert C.
Johansen, Refoming the United Nations to Eliminate War 4 TRANSN'L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 455
(1994).
86 U.N. CHARTER art. 43,1 1 (emphasis added).
87 See supra note 17; see also Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, U.N. Police Action in Lieu of
War: "The Old Order Changeth,"85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991); Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution
and ChapterVII of the United Nations Charte, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 74 (1990).
88 See supra note 19.
89 As Professor Henkin noted in his General Course at the Hague, "[The Charter] declares
peace as the supreme value ... more compelling even than human rights or other human
values." LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS, VALUES AND FUNCrIONS 146 (1990).
Professor Glennon succinctly concludes, "[a]bsent safeguards that do not yet exist, [the]
principle should be non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states as embodied in the
United Nation's Charter." Michael J. Glennon, Sovereignty and Community After Haiti: Re-thinking
the Collective Use ofForce, 89 AM.J. INT LL. 70, 74 (1995).
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Nations. 90 As it is for Mel trying to discuss love, initial efforts to develop
a working framework for talking about war are likely to be frustrating. 9 1
It is precisely the roughness of these efforts, however, and the resultant
awkward gaps, that invites discussion.9 2
2. The Students
Whether or not a metanarrative underlies domestic law, the law's
density keeps most law students too busy to even ask the question. 93 For
them, domestic law itself provides a sufficient normative framework:
"This is what 'fault' is in marriage"; "The burden is on the state to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." For many, the "ordinary religion"
described by Roger Cramton is enough.9 4 For other students, the basic
premises of the Judeo-Christian tradition still provide a common set of
values which need never be made explicit. Even the most alienated
students can get through law school without grappling with the question
of metanarrative. 95
In stark contrast, the law on the use of force has no metanarrative
nor the illusion of metanarrative. The only agreed-upon values are the
90 Because the Cold War froze the discussion, efforts to develop a narrative have been delayed for fifty years. Unlike their predecessors, few world leaders today have shared the unifying
experience of World War II. See QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 388-430 (1965) (an historical
compilation of efforts following wars to prevent their recurrence).
91 See, e.g., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, AnAgendafor Peace, 31 I.LM. 956 (1992).
92 See, e.g., ENFORCING RESTRAINT. COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS
(Lori E Damrosch ed., 1993); Symposium, Peace4pingin Situations of Civil War, 26 N.YU.J. INT'L
L. & POL. 623 (1994).
93 Nor is this the most urgent question for their teachers, who, law teacher-like, tend to
frame their answers carefully: "To the extent there is, it is male," say the feminists; "To the extent
there is, it is racist," say the critical race scholars; "Just the loose, flexible metanarrative of
liberalism," say the liberals; "Just the self-serving rhetoric of liberalism," say the Crits; "Not any
more," say the postmodernists.
94 SeeRoger C. Cramton, The OrdinaryReligion of the Law School Classroom, 29J. LEGAL EDUC.
247, 248 (1978) [hereinafter The Ordinary Religion]:
The essential ingredients of the ordinary religion of the American law school classroom
[are] ... skeptical attitudes towards generalizations; an instrumental approach to law
and lawyering-, a "tough minded" and analytical attitude toward legal tasks and professional roles; and a faith that man, by the application of his reason and the use of democratic processes, can make the world a better place.
See also Beyond the OrdinaryReligion, supranote 24, at 512 ("Although there obviously is much truth
in aspects of the 'ordinary religion, two fatal flaws undermine it. The first is that it remains
outside the agenda. We suggest that something is true without explicitly addressing it .... The
second flaw is that The Answer is not the whole truth."); see Kathanne T Bartlett, Teaching Values:
A Dilemma, 37J. LEGAL EDUC. 519, 520-21 (1987):
[W]e have not succeeded in teaching our students about who they are and how they
will relate to their profession unless we have truly helped them to find their own answers to the questions Cramton asks... imposing our current versions of ourselves on
our students perverts both our stories and theirs, and limits the potential richness and
depth of a profession in which difference should be celebrated.
95 After all, it is not on the bar exam (neither is international law). Those students who
uestioned the premises of the dominant discourse before law school are often dismayed to
iscover the extent to which these premises remain unquestioned in law school. See The Ordinary
Religion, supranote 94; Beyond the OrdinaryReligion, supranote 24.
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prohibition on the use of force and the basic premise of state autonomy.
It is therefore critical to understand the function of a shared metanarrative, in order to find or create a functional substitute. For example, to
the extent that a metanarrative facilitates conflict resolution by filling in
the gaps, other means must be found for filling in those gaps.
While domestic law may be similarly thin when first adopted, it is
fleshed out by judicial interpretation. Domestic judicial interpretations
draw on precisely the kind of metanarrative missing here. In international law, for example, the major judicial interpretation on the use of
force is the lengthy and carefully written opinion of the International
Court ofJustice in the Nicaraguacase. 96 Although the Nicaraguadecision
is widely cited, I.C.J. opinions are not binding precedent. 97
Nor can we depend upon other organs of international law to generate the missing jurisprudence. The General Assembly is not properly a
lawmaking body. The Security Council has "primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security" 98 and broad
powers with which to carry out its duties. 99 Since the Security Council
was basically dormant during the Cold War, however, Security Council
'Jurisprudence" remains in its infancy. There is still considerable uncertainty, and commensurate caution, about the process for invoking
Security Council jurisdiction, as well as the scope and authority of such
jurisdiction.100
The absence of metanarrative in the U.N. Charter is not an oversight.
Rather, it represents a deliberate pre-emption of the metanarrative of
'Justifiable war."101 The only public policy, the only relevant "intent," the
only goal is lasting peace for autonomous states. The law on the use of
force promotes this goal in two ways: first, by identifying it not only as
legitimate but as paramount; and, second, by providing objective criteria.
As Use of Force shows through two case studies, the United States' invasion of Panama and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, 102 the absence of
metanarrative simplifies the legitimating function of the law. The Gulf
War was widely hailed as an effective application of the law on the use of
force.10 Although it drew on much of the same rhetoric, however, the

96 USE OF FORCE, suprT note 1, at 181-96 (includes cogent introduction and excerpts from
dissenting and majority opinions); see aLso id. at 262-63 (General Assembly Resolution urging "full

and immediate compliance with the [decisions]").
97 L.CJ. STAT. art. 59 (IGJ decisions not binding except between the parties and in respect
of that particular case).
98 U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
99 U.N. CHARTER arts. 23-32.

44.

100 SeeAlvarez, supranote 67; USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 24446.
101 Before the Charter, war was a state prerogative. See infra text accompanying notes 143102 USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 1-107.

103 An account of the Gulf War is used to introduce USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 1. But
cf Henkin, supra note 89, at 164 ("[T]he President had no constitutional authority to use force to
liberate Kuwait, since there was no mandatory resolution of the Security Council.").
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invasion of Panama brought on international condemnation.104 Some
commentators saw both as part of a cynical metanarrative, that of the
furtherance of United States interests. Others saw both as part of a
noble metanarrative: saving innocent people from tyrants and protecting democracy. Neither metanarrative is recognized under the Charter,
however. Instead, as the international community understood, the only
relevant legal question under the Charter was whether either invasion
violated the Article 2(4) prohibition and, if so, whether either fell under
the self-defense exception.
The legitimacy of the Gulf War and the invasion of Panama depends
on the answers. If an invasion is prohibited by the Charter-as both the
invasion of Kuwait and the invasion of Panama were-the victim state
can lawfully defend itself and ask other states to join in its "collective selfdefense."105 Thus, because Iraq's use of force against Kuwait was prohibited by the Charter, Kuwait could lawfully defend itself, and the multilateral response against Iraq, at Kuwait's request, was legitimate collective
self-defense.
The invasion of Panama, like the invasion of Kuwait, was illegal, but
the new Panamanian government, installed with United States support,
did not ask other states to join in its collective self-defense. Although
there was no multilateral military response against the United States, the
invasion was widely condemned 106 and even criticized by some United
States allies. 07 The United States lost credibility as a law-abiding state, as
well as 25 American lives.1 08
The criteria for determining whether or not the Charter has been
violated must be clear and consistently applied. The absence of
metanarrative both increases the need for objective criteria and makes it
more difficult to establish them, as Use ofForce shows in the excerpts from
the Nicaragua decision.109 What exactly amounts to a "use of force"?
The International Court of Justice answered this question only after
undertaking the most careful and painstaking analysis of the existing
international consensus on the law, with particular attention to the
parties' own acts and admissions.1 1 0 Only after this exhaustive review did
the Court find that "organization of armed bands for incursion into the
territory of another," "reprisal," and "terrorist acts""' each fell within the
Article 2(4) prohibition.
104 This is documented with excerpts from Security Council debates, during which Algeria,
Columbia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution
deploring the intervention. USE OFFORCE, supranote 1, at 85.
105 U.N. CHARER art. 52.
106 France "regretted" the U.S. action. USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 92.
107 Sweden joined in the GA Resolution condemning it. Id. at 96.
108 Lindsey Gruson, G. 's in Panama Report Gains in Restoring Onkr, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
1989, in USE OFFORCE, supranote 1, at 82-83. 139 Panamanian lives were reported lost. Id.
109 USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 184.

110 See generally WIadyslaw Czaplinski, Sources of InternationalLaw in the Nicaragua Case, in
USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 197.

111 USE OF FORCE, supra note 1,at 187.
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The lack of metanarrative is further reflected in the lack of established procedures for resolving disputes. Instead, international lawyers
have developed a wide-ranging repertoire of methods. These are often
surprisingly familiar to American law students, who have learned about
them in classes on alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 112 In groups of
five or'six,113 students in class replicate the open-ended approaches to
problem-solving relied on by states."14
They start by breaking problems down into four basic steps developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Separating people from the problems.
Focusing on interests, not positions.
Generating options.
Choosing among options by objective criteria. 115

While Use of Force provides enough information for such exercises, its
"negative space" invites students to supplement it. In an international
law class last year, we used Use of Force as the basis for an exercise on the
Bosnian conflict. 116 The students brought in maps, news clippings, and
regional histories to develop the texture of the dispute. They drew on
techniques learned in other classes, such as arbitration and mediation, to
"generate options."

112 ADR has its genesis in international law. New problem-solving tools were required in
the international context because the absence of a shared metanarrative left no alternative. See
all ROGER FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS (1969); ROGER FISHER &
AMJ. URY,GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981);
Richard -..Bilder, International Third Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 471

(1989); United Nations, Draft Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes Between States, 30 I.LM. 229
(1991).
113 In my experience this is workable group size. Larger groups become more cumber-

some. On occasion I have deliberately put students into larger groups to give them an idea of
how much more cumbersome it can &et. Professor Wildnan suggests having students switch
roles in connection with a single exercise. She describes dividing "the entire class into g.oups,
each representing a different special interest lobby that will offer 'testimony' to the legislature
about the proposed legislation .... After hearing from representatives of all the groups, the
legislature convenes. The class members now abandon their previous role s interest group
representatives and debate the appropriate legislative action." Wildman, supra note 63, at 153.
See also Woodhouse, supra note 68.
114 See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumensi 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461, 470-71 (1987) ("Lawyering is pre-eminenly problem solving;
thinking like a lawyer is having the ability to look at some facts, decide what is missing and what
could be added, and relating those facts to 'the law' in such a way as to solve the client's
problem."); cf Zulack, supra note 69, at 613 (explaining why an "attorney-imposed regime"
should be avoided where parties "would have to live with and implement their decisions").
There are, of course, other possibilities. For example, students in an exercise may decide to
submit the problem to the IGJ. Cf Wildman, supra note 63, at 152-53 (students convene as a
court or as a legislative body).
115 FISHER & URY, supra note 112, at 13. Fisher and Ury describe the 1975 Israeli-Egyptian
conflict over the Sinai peninsula as an example of problem-solving. Egypt was concerned with
sovereignty; Israel was concerned with security. Once their respective interests were clearly
identified, they could be addressed separately and the conflict was peaceably resolved.
116 See Mark Weller, The InternationalResponse to the Dissolution of the Socialist FederalRepublic
of Yugoslavia in USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 370-81; Mary Ellen O'Connell, ContinuingLimits on
U.N.Intenention in Civil War, in USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 387; No ly Zone over Bosnia Okayed
by U.N.; Resolution: Security Council Says Air Combat Patrols Are an Option If Serbs Vlate the Ban, LA
TiMES, Oct. 10, 1992, at A8,reinted in USE OF FORCE, supranote 1,at 390-91.
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Students also used law learned in other classes to establish objective
criteria. Some tried to draw on the U.S. Constitution, arguing that
assurances of political and civil rights would facilitate settlement.
Students who had taken international human rights suggested relying on
the International Bill of Rights instead,"l 7 pointing out that the Civil and
Political Covenant contains essentially the same assurances and would
probably be more palatable to the parties.
In this and other exercises, students also develop criteria using
common sense. Is a particular proposal practical? Is it likely to lead to
durable peace? Does it make the most of existing resources? Is it too
dependent on outside support? Is it likely to appeal to domestic constituencies as well as to the broader global community? Is it likely to be
supported by surrounding states? Students are asked to make their
criteria explicit, and to explain why those criteria are likely to be accepted by the states involved.
The Bosnian exercise concluded with a class discussion, in which I
used the blackboard to chart the issues addressed, the various approaches taken to each, and the range of agreed-upon, albeit partial,
resolutions.1 8 Although students understood that no agreement has
precedential value, like international negotiatorsll 9 they found themselves trying what had worked before, building on prior successes,
learning from earlier dead-ends, incrementally adding to a contextualized rhetoric of peace.
III. FAITH IN RHETORIC

A. In Carver's Story
The negative space in Carver's story is part of a larger emptinessthe gaping cavern left by the loss or rejection of metanarrative. Courtly
love is an anachronism; it is no longer part of any coherent metanarra-

117 The legal instruments constituting the International Bill of Rights are the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter the "Civil
Covenant"]; Text of the Resolution of Ratification, 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992) (ratification of the Civil
Covenant by the U.S. Senate), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.TS. 3.
118 Despite their best efforts, the students were in fact unable to resolve the Bosnian conflict. I considered this evidence of their seriousness and of their appreciation of the conflict's
complexities. In the spring of 1995, world leaders could do no better. Seegenerally, Roger Cohen,
Taming the Bullies of Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 17, 1995, at 58 (describing how the personali-

ties of the leaders and the negotiators impeded and facilitated resolution). A shift in the balance
of power in the region, attributed to massive air strikes as well as the new political resolve that
made air strikes possible, eventually led to the Dayton Peace Agreement, initialed in Dayton,
Ohio, Nov. 21, 1995. The situation remains problematic, however, domestically as well as
internationally. See, e.g., R.W. Apple,Jr., Flimsy Bosnia Mandate,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at 1.
119 See, e.g., R.W. Apple, Jr., How the World Makes Bosnia Safe for War, N.Y TIMES, June 4,
1995, at E4 (noting efforts of international negotiators, including Lord Owen, Cyrus Vance, and
Jimmy Carter, to resolve the Bosnian conflict).
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tive that can help the characters identify their feelings.1 20 Although the
rhetoric of courtly love may still have nostalgic appeal for some, even Mel
concedes that modernity blew it away long ago: "It was all right being a
knight until gun powder, muskets and pistols came along."121 By
"modernity," I refer broadly to the Enlightenment project-the writings
of Immanuel Kant, the values of the French Revolution, and a belief in
reason, science and human perfectibility. 22 Faith in progress and
science replaced traditional belief systems, including religion, as the
dominant discourse.
Progress and science added little to the human understanding of
love, however, and Carver's characters seem to have lost their faith in
these as well. 12s The "progress" that keeps the two old people in Mel's
hospital marginally alive on high-tech life-support is the same "progress"
that smashed into them on the freeway. Progress is illusory and science
has not changed human nature.12 4 Mel is 'just a sawbones"; his mastery
of modern medicine gives him no special understanding of the human
heart.
Carver's characters have sloughed off whatever belief systems might
once have supported them. They can only believe in the validity of their
own experience and in their ability to somehow make sense of it. As
philosopher Charles Taylor has described it:
We are now in an age in which a publicly accessible cosmic order
of meanings is an impossibility. The only way we can explore the
order in which we are set with an aim to defining moral sources is
through this part of personal resonance .... As our public traditions of family, ecology, even polis are undermined or swept
away, we need new languages of personal resonance to make crucial human goods alive for us again.125
Carver's people have not yet found a "new language of personal
resonance." Instead, "their talk is groping, rudimentary. They have no
120 Facts can be deadly to romance:
But sometimes they suffocated in all that armor, Mel. They even had heart attacks if it
got too hot and they were too tired and worn out. I read somewhere they would fall off
their horses and not be able to get up because they were too tired to stand with all that
armor on them. They got trampled by their own horses sometimes.
CARVER, supra note 2, at 149.
121 Id. at 148.
122 Williams, suatsranote 74, at 805; see aLso Nathan Gardels & Marilyn B. Snell, Debris of the
Avant-Garde: The ImaginationAfter Modernity, NEW PERS. Q., Spring 1992, at 2 ("Modernism was
about trading in tradition for the future .... Criticism was modernism's instrument in philosophy, revolution its instrument in politics and the avant-garde in art. Progress was the modern
faith that would see us through successive stages of development to Utopia at the end of
history.").
125 Cf STING, If I Ever Lose My Faith in You, on TEN SUMMONER'S TALES (A&M Records
1993) (loss of faith in science and progress is tolerable, but loss of faith in a lover is not).
124 As Terri coolly observes, "[People in the days of chivalry fought over the] same things
we fight over these days." CARVER, supranote 2, at 149.
125 TAYLOR, supranote 25, at 512-13. For a provocative critique of such reliance, see Joan
W Scott, "Expe
t,in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE PoLTICAL 22, 25 (Judith Butler &Joan W. Scott
eds., 1992) (arguing that "the project of making experience visible precludes analysis of the
workings of [the system which produced it] and of its historicity; instead it reproduces its terms").
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wisdom to purvey."126 . They speak in what critic James Atlas describes as
the "barren idiom of our time[,] an idiom of refusal, a repudiation of
the idea of greatness."'127
The story leaves the reader as hungry as the characters, who are still
without dinner as it ends. "Carver ... [is] so resolute about not saying
any more than [he has] to in order to convey a story's import, so aggressive in the suppression of detail, that one is left with a hunger for richness, texture, excess."' 28 This hunger, however, is precisely the point:
"At its best, his willfully simple style concentrates our attention, requires
us to supply our own conclusions."129 Embedded in the repudiation of
the idea of greatness is an invitation to join in a new conversation, to
find or construct rhetoric that reflects lived experience, rhetoric that
personally resonates for us, in our own time and in our own contexts. 13 0
The old rhetoric has only limited uses. The rhetoric of courtly love
was part of the metanarrative of "the Christianization of the Roman
Empire."l 3 ' Carver's characters would undoubtedly chafe under its rigid
hierarchy, but they need rhetoric to shape their inchoate feelings, to
imbue those feelings with socially sanctioned meaning, to make "crucial
human goods"-such as love-"alive for them again." They will apparently have to create their own new rhetoric and they sit there, in the
dark, waiting for the process to begin. The process does begin when the
narrator writes the story we have just read. The narrator writes not
because he is a "writer," but because he is human, a social animal who
functions in a social context, and in order to experience love he needs to
be able to "talk about it," to use rhetoric to make it part of ,that social
context. 3 2 The narrator's unspecified link to the law133 is particularly

126 James Atlas, Less is Less, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1981, at 96 (reviewing WHAT WE
TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT LOVE).

127 Id. at 98. John Barth has described Carver's work as "postnodernist blue-collar" and as
"K-Mart realism." John Barth, A Few Words About Minimais
1986, at 1.
128 Atlas, supranote 126, at 96.
129 Id.

N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Dec. 28,

130 This invitation also resonates with American notions of participatory democracy and
pluralism. ROBEr BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART. INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN

AMERICAN LIFE (1985). For an example of such new rhetoric, see Audre Lorde to Adrienne Rich,
An Interview with Audre Lorde, 6 SIGNS 713, 714 (1981) ("When you asked how I began writing, I

told you how poetry functioned specficially for me from the time I was very young, from nursery
rhymes. When someone said to me, "how do you feel?" or "what do you think?" or asked another
direct question, I would recite a poem, and somewhere in that poem would be the feeling,
somewhere in it would be the piece of information. It might be a line. It might be an image.
The poem was my response.").
131 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991). This metanarrative was a rich tapestry which accrued over centuries, addressing human relations from intimate human love and the
family hierarchy under which it presumably flourished to the divine right of kings, the Crusades,
and the notion of divinely ordained "just war."

132 Even where I believe that I see a truth about the human condition that no one
else has seen ... it still must be on the basis of my reading of others' thought and language... somehow I have to meet the challenge: do I know what I'm saying? Do I
really grasp what I'm talking about? And this challenge I can only meet by confronting
my thought and language with the thought and the actions of others.
TAYLOR, supranote 25, at 37.
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pertinent here because it affirms the lawyer's role as storyteller, as one
who is relied upon to create rhetoric.
B. In the Law School Classroom
1. The Text
Like Carver's rhetoric, the rhetoric of the U.N. Charter is arid. 3 4 Its
tone is cool, its voice is carefully passive. Like Carver's language, it is "an
idiom of refusal, a repudiation of the idea of greatness."'135 Unlike Mel,
the drafters of the U.N. Charter had little nostalgia for the rhetoric of
the past. From the emergence of the nation-state in the 17th century
until World War I, a state could declare war for any reason. Indeed, a
state could declare war for no reason at all, although, for political
reasons, such declarations were usuallyjustified by the "vital interests" of
the state. This notion of "justifiable war,"' 3 6 already dubious by the
beginning of World War I, was virtually inconceivable after World War
11.137

After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world powers were ready to

recognize peace as a paramount value.138 The rhetoric of the Charter is
"an idiom of refusal," a rejection of the metanarratives used to justify war.
Just as the absence of metanarrative in Carver's story leaves Mel's
rhetoric open to question, the rejection of the pre-Charter metanarrative
of 'Justifiable war" leaves the rhetoric which had evolved under that
metanarrative problematic. Use of Force recognizes the dilemma of preCharter principles in the context of post-Charter issues. 139 Yet states
draw from these fragments of rhetoric in constructing new rhetoric. Use
133 He met his wife Laura, a legal secretary, in a "professional capacity." While this leaves
open the possibility that he is a client, a court reporter or another legal secretary, Mel's inability
to intimidate him, as well as his slightly stilted choice of words, suggest that he is probably a
lawyer, ajudge, a law teacher or law student. SeeWYDICK, supranote 64, at 3.
134 Cf. USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 358 (citing John Quincy Adams for the proposition
that a new government should be recognized when "independence is established as a matter of
fact so as to leave the chances of the opposite party to recover their dominion utterly desperate").
135 See supu note 127. The dispassionate language of many of the Charter's provisions, see,
e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 2, 1 4, 24, 43, 52, contrasts dramatically with the soaring rhetoric of its
preamble ("[T]o save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind."). The preamble to the U.N. Charter, like that
of the U.S. Constitution, has no legal effect.
136 St. Augustine defined a just war" as one intended to avenge injuries. REBECCA M.M.
WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 217 (1986).
137 Cf General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug.
27, 1928, 4 U.S.T. 5130,94 L.N.T.S. 57 (Kellogg-Briand Pact).
138 Unimaginable destruction, including the literal destruction of the planet, was the obviously untenable alternative. Americans have yet to collectively come to terms with the fact that
this country dropped atomic bombs on civilian populations, as shown by the outcry regarding the
recent Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian. "In both Japan and the United States], the facts of
wartime atrocities can be uncovered with little effort. What we do not yet know for sure is how we
should react to those facts and what they imply about our societies today." John Whittier Treat,
Remembering the Bomb, N.Y TIEs, June 25, 1995, at E15; cf Mathew Bernstein & Mark Ravina,
Film Review, 98 AM. HIs. REV. 1161, 1162 (1993) (reviewing RHAPSODY INAUGUST (Shochiky Co.
1991), discussed infra note 157) (describing how "eagerness to understand the tragedy of
Nagasaki unites rather than divides" aJapanese-American and hisJapanese second cousins).
139 See, e.g., USE OF FORCE, supmrnote 1, at 305-06.
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of Force offers cogent, accessible excerpts of original texts, 140 as well as a
full range of contemporary interpretation. For example, the authors
include a brief excerpt of an article by Jeane Kirkpatrick and Allan
Gersonl4l in defense of the "Reagan doctrine," 142 although the "Reagan
doctrine" was severely criticized even when he was in office.
Just as it is up to the characters in Carver's story to create rhetoric
upon which they can agree, it is up to states to create rhetoric which
resonates for all of the parties to a conflict, if it is to be resolved peacefully.1 43 The terse language of the Charter, like Carver's language, leaves
us with "a hunger for richness, texture, nuance." It invites states to bring
•culture, history, and psychology into their negotiations, to contextualize
the law. 144 Use of Force similarly invites students to supplement its materials, to look for the stories of the human beings actually involved, to

explore the ways in which the law on the use of force can be shaped to
address human concerns.
2. The Students
Peter Brooks, who teaches comparative literature and lectures in law
at Yale, explains how we make sense of our experience by shaping it into
stories. 145 The shared rhetoric with which we link our individual stories
helps make sense of our communal, public life.146 War stories 14 7 are
140 These include several rousing, famous, and infamous, communications, such as Secretary of State Daniel Webster's note to the British Prime Minister in 1842. USE OF FORCE, supra
note 1,at 319.
141 USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 321.

142 This refers to President Reagan's commitment to intervene militarily to "restore selfgovernment." JeaneJ. Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine: A Violation of the U.N.
Charter?,in USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 325.
143 'Making up' a quarrel is a process in which the parties gradually, and often with
great difficulty, come to share a common language for the description of their common
past, present, and future, including an agreement as to what will be passed over in silence. In this process they reestablish themselves as a community with a culture of their
own.
JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 38

(1985).
144 The authors describe, for example, an emerging consensus as to "embargoes, sanctions
and other counter-measures [that] are not prohibited in Article 2(4)." USE OF FORCE, supranote
1, at 269.
145 PETER BROOKS, READING FORTHE PLOT (1984).

146 D'Amato, supranote 114, at 485 n.43 ("As law teachers know, sometimes the classroom
itself turns into a large mind .... The professor then, in a way, becomes just one more input into
the classroom mind, which takes over.").
147 1 mean literal "war stories." See, e.g.,. Untold War Stories, N.Y. TES MAG., May 7, 1995, at
53 (collection of first person accounts, commemorating the 50th anniversary of World War II).
The common use of the phrase, in ironic quotes, to refer to the stories of legal practice, of early
years in a big firm or in legal services, is worth noting. Like literal war stories, these express the
values, risks, dangers and rewards of life in a particular community. Feminist legal "war stories"
add another twist, describing women's occupation of historically male turf, and doing so through
the appropriation of an historically gendered narrative form. Cf Ann Darr, The Women Who FewBut Kept Silent, N.Y. TIMES MAG., MAY 7, 1995, at 70 (1,074 women pilots were erased from history
until 1977).
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particularly important. They tell us what our highest values are, what we
are willing to die for. They tell us what we are capable of, from the most
tender sacrifices to the most brutal acts of violence. They enable us to
demonize our enemies, destroy their cities, and kill their children. And
they enable us to exult after doing so, as if we had won a game.
War stories reflect the culture as well as the time of which they are a
part.148 Those of us who grew up in the 1960s were told World War II
stories. 149 For a generation, Vietnam became the definitive war story, a
story that undermined the rhetoric of war itself. Many opposed U.S.
involvement because it was unlawful.150 The norms of the Charter were
already a part of our rhetoric, part of our consciousness. Because there
was no serious question of self-defense or collective self-defense in
Vietnam, there was no credible justification for the United States' use of
force.
Since the end of the Cold War, the rhetoric of war has became increasingly unintelligible, as the chaotic struggles in Somalia'51 and
Bosnia have demonstrated. Instead of rhetoric, we have only "pastiche":
Pastiche is, like parody, an imitation of a peculiar mask, speech in
a dead language, but it is a neutral practice at such mimicry,
without any of parody's ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric
impulse, devoid of laughter and of any conviction that alongside
of the abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some
healthy linguistic normality still exists. 152
Can rhetoric capable of supporting an often fragile peace be constructed from this "abnormal tongue?"'SS Can stories that are not only
meaningful, but compelling-stories able to reconcile the bitterest
enemies-be constructed from a "dead language"? The rhetoric of
peace must resonate for those actually involved in the conflict. To
construct such rhetoric, or even to conceptualize a framework from
which such rhetoric might emerge, is at the very least a daunting task,
perhaps an impossible one.

148 As Professor White has pointed out, in a discussion of the Iliad, "to understand these
actors and events, we need the Homeric words themselves, the language that defines the social
world and the values that give particular meaning to the dispute. Only in the language of this
culture can argument proceed about the issue of justice that has arisen with it." WHITE, supra
note 143, at 224. For an example of ineffective rhetoric, see FOR THE BONS (20th Century Fox
1991).
149 See Untold War Stories, supranote 147.
150 A compelling legal analysis of the "Viet-Nam situation" by Quincy Wright is included in
USE OF FORCE, supranote 1, at 361.
151 See generallyAndrew Tulumello, Rethinking Somalia's 'Clanism, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 230
(1993); Don Oberdorfer, U.S. Took Slow Approach to Somali Crisis, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1992, at
A13;Jane Perlez, Theft ofFood Aid is a Business in StarvingSoma/a,N.Y. TIMES, Sept.4,1992, at Al.
152 FredricJameson, Postmodernism, o, the CulturalLogic of Late Capitalism, NEW LEFT REV.,

July-Aug. 1984, at 59, 65.

153 An important subtext here is the extent to which we should be constructing it; that is,
while the United States must be a participant, the role of the United States in post-Cold War
peacekeeping remains a very open question. See, e.g., Symposium, InternationalLaw for a New
World Order,81 GEO.L.J.481 (1993).
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By the time American students come to law school, however, many of
them have a fierce faith in rhetoric.154 This is not surprising; they are,
after all, self-selected over-achievers who have spent much of their youth
leading debate or moot court teams, editing school newspapers, and
running student governments as well as various civic associations. Their
law school applications evince an enduring belief in committee meetings, participatory democracy, and the arts of persuasion.155 They
believe that a compromise that all parties can live with is almost always
possible. They believe that they can shape the most chaotic experience
into coherent legal narratives.1 56
Although law students may have faith in rhetoric, and their own ability to craft it, few have much relevant experience to draw on. We have
not had a war in this country within living memory, and few students
have ever served in the armed forces. They have seen movies and read
books, of course, but everyone knows that is not the same.1 57 They lack
experience in which to ground their rhetoric. As William Shepard
McAninch has pointed out, this is a frequent problem in law school:
"Whatever the subject, many of the students are approaching some of
the issues abstractly, in a vacuum. By structuring an experience or two
for them, we may become much more effective teachers, whatever our
usual methodology."15 8 Professor McAninch describes how he structured
such an experience for the students in his constitutional law class:
I announced... that it seemed appropriate to begin that session
with a prayer. I responded to their startled expressions by assuring them that no one who did not want to need take part, that
any such person could stand in the hall until it was over, and that
154 There are, of course, the cynics; those who question the activities, such as moot court
or law review, into which their classmates plunge. In my experience, these often reveal themselves as the most incorrigible idealists.
155 This is based on five years on the Admissions Committee at the University of Tennessee.
Law school applications may say as much about what applicants think an Admissions Committee
wants to see as about the applicants themselves, of course. See also LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS
COUNCIL, SOYOU WANT TO BE A LAwYER (1994); LOOKING AT LAW SCHOOL (Stephen Gillers, 1II,
ed., 1990); see generally HELEN POIVEL & ROBERT DIANTONIO, THE ADMISSIONS ESSAY (1995).

156 Doing without frameworks is utterly impossible for us ... this is not meantjust as a
contingently true psychological fact about human beings, which could perhaps turn
out one day not to hold for some exceptional individual or new type, some superman
of disengaged objectification. Rather the claim is that living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would
be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human personhood.
TAYLOR, supranote 25, at 27.
157 For a film dealing with this very problem, see RHAPSODY INAUGUST, supra note 138.
Four children, two of them teenagers, are spending the summer with their grandmother outside
of Nagasaki, where their grandfather was killed by the atom bomb 45 years earlier. The
grandmother tells the children stories, each evoking a particular spot in Nagasaki. The children
then visit these sites, from a melted jungle gym transformed into a memorial, to trees in the
mountains, struck by lightning. The grandother's stories are confirmed by the children's
physical experience of place, and the places are given meaning by her stories.
158 William Shepard McAninch, ExperientialLearning in a TraditionalClassroom, 36J. LEGAL
EDUC. 420, 426 (1986). For an exploration of the relationship between experiential learning and
moral development, see Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential
Teaching, 1CLINICAL L. REV. 505 (1995).
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no prejudice would attach to any one selecting that option. This
assurance was repeated. There were no takers. I then asked
them all to rise and face the East and told them to listen as I intoned the prayer: 'There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is
His prophet.' End of exercise. 159
How can law students acquire a similarly concrete experience in a
class on the use of force?16 0 A hoax, a false announcement of an attack
at the beginning of class, for example, would be too risky if it were
realistic enough to be effective.161 As an alternative, students can listen
to guest lecturers' first-person accounts of war experience.162 Another
way to bring experience into the classroom, as I discovered accidentally
in our class on civil war, is simply to allow students to draw on their own
history. The materials on civil war in Use of Force include an excellent
excerpt by Quincy Wright on the American Civil War.163 Our law school
is in the eastern, mountainous part of Tennessee, geographically and
culturally more a part of Appalachia than of the South. Unlike the
central and western parts of the state, the eastern region was never
dependent on cotton or slaves, and many East Tennesseeans opposed
Tennessee's secession from the Union.164 At the same time, Knoxville
was a Confederate stronghold, and a battle site about a block from the
law school marks a failed Confederate assault on Union forces.16 5
Students told stories of great-grandparents who had been the only
Republicans in their counties, of the long-term costs of Reconstruction
and of Jim Crow, and of their experience with cultural tensions between
North and South that remain sharp.166

159 McAninch, supra note 158, at 420.
160 "Paint ball!" a student answered promptly, referring to camps where adults go for a
weekend and organize into teams to play a more realistic version of "capture the flag." Players
are armed with paint-shooting weapons and those who are "shot" are considered "lost troops."
This is precisely the perception we must overcome. Too many Americans already think of war as
a game.
161 Indeed, this is close to the paradigm of prohibitable speech, Holmes' famous hypothetical example of a man "falsely shouting 'fire' in a [crowded] theatre." Schenck v. Uniied
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Professor McAninch's exercise is effective because at the very moment students are made
uncomfortable, they presumably realize that the prayer is "justan exercise." This presumes, of
course, that Professor McAninch's students know that he is not a practicing Muslim, and that his

prayer is a ruse.
162 As Mari Matsuda has suggested in another context, "[t]he technique of imagining one-

self black and poor in some hypothetical world is less effective than studying the actual experience of black poverty and listening to those who have done so." Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: CitticalLegalStudies and Reparations,22 HAR. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 325 (1987).
163 USE OFFORCE, supra note 1, at 351.
164 Indeed, 31,092joined the Union forces. DIGBYGORDON SEYMOUR, DIVIDED LOYALTIES:
FORT SANDERS AND THE CIVIL WAR IN EAST TENNESSEE 7 (2d ed. 1982).
165 Id.
166 Students described, for example, being patronized, treated like emissaries from a
backwards region, by college roommates in the North. I had been oblivious to this form of
subordination as a "dominant" Northerner. With a shock of recognition I remembered what I
had thought of as "good-natured teasing" of a college friend from Tennessee.
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Under international law, slavery is now illegal,167 and it was illegal in
1865. Under classic international law, the North could probably have
forced the South to remain in the Union. If the U.N. Charter had
existed, would it have changed this? Could the South have insisted on
"self-determination?" Could the North have invaded on "humanitarian"
grounds? Would the Security Council have intervened? Gradually,
painstakingly, the students began grappling with these questions, drawing on their68own experience as Appalachians, as Southerners, and as
"outsiders,"1 building on the "willfully simple"169 rhetoric of the Charter, and groping, sometimes uncomfortably, toward their own legal
narratives.
IV. CONCLUSION-LOCATING "REVELATION"
Carver's characters still believe that they can create rhetoric which
will enable their finer feelings to flourish, rhetoric which will containor at least inhibit-their violent impulses, despite their own past failures,
and what some see as the long history of human failure in this area.
When we "talk about love," we engage in the process of creating rhetoric,
deconstructing old narratives and drawing on the fragments for rhetoric
that "personally resonates" for us. We engage in the same process, albeit
with a different objective, when we talk about law and the use of force.
Carver's story is transformative. Like the characters, the reader is left
sitting alone with her own unresolved questions, "in the dark" and
hungry, unsatisfied. But the reader is conscious now, listening to her own
"human noise" and ready for what Hannah Arendt has described as "an
anticipated communication with others with whom [he] knows [he]
must finally come to some agreement.'170
Critic Robert Houston has described how Carver's stories locate
"revelation" not in the characters, but in the reader:
Carver's characters feel and suffer, they grope, they instinctively
understand that something terrible or important is happening to
167 Indeed, the prohibition against slavery is often cited as an example of jus cogens, a peremptory norm in international law. For a succinct introduction to the role ofjus cogens in the law
on the use of force, see Mark W. Janis, Jus Cogens, in USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 177;
Gennady M. Danilenko, InternationalJusCogens: Issues of Law-making, in USE OF FORCE, supra
note 1, at 178.
168 There were students from the North in the class, who had learned about a very different Civil War in their elementary schools, as well as two students from Germany and one student
whose family was Palestinian. They had been in Tennessee long enough to realize that any
extended discussion of the Civil War was likely to reveal exposed nerves, but not sufficiently
steeped in the history of the place to grasp when or why this might happen. The importance and
difficulties of teaching about the Civil War is, of course, deeply interwoven with the need to teach
about race, and the problems likely to be encountered in doing so. For a perceptive discussion,
see Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1512
(1991).
169 Seetext accompanying note 129130, supra.
170 HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: Six EXERcISEs IN POLITICAL THOUGHT
220 (1961).

1996

What We Talk About When We Talk About War

them. They sense the menace in ordinary life, they feel the wind
from the chasm below the cliffs edge that they, that we, all dance
along. But they never quite bring themselves to lean over and
look into the chasm, to put into words just what those terrible or
important things are. It is up to us to do that. We must experience those revelations for them. Carver has led us to the cliffs
over it. And therein lies the devastating
edge, and we must look
17
power of the stories. 1
Use of Force, similarly, locates "revelation" not in the doctrine or theory or practice of the law on the use of force, but in the readers, the
students.172 This essay has explained how it does so. First, by focusing
on state identity, Use of Force shows how state interests shape the narrative
and how the principle of state autonomy defuses authority. Second, Use
of Force grapples with the negative space, the Charter's rejection of the
metanarratives of 'Justifiable war." The law on the use of force looks
nothing like the heavily annotated and subsectioned domestic law
students see in their other courses. This is part of its "idiom of refusal,"173 its refusal to elevate an abstract ideal above the real horror of
war. Finally, Use of Force provides the rhetorical fragments still remaining
from the old metanarrative with which to construct more modest, "little"
stories that resonate for those whose experience they reflect. The case
studies in Volume II encourage students to explore issues of identity
through role-playing exercises, to bridge the negative space in the law
through problem-solving techniques, and to make sense of their own
experience by shaping it into coherent legal narratives.
Locating "revelation" in the students is particularly apt in this context because the Charter law on the use of force locates "revelation" in
the states themselves. Unlike domestic law, which relies on detailed
statutory or administrative texts or independent courts to tailor law to
particular contexts, the Charter functions without intermediary mechanisms that might insulate states from the consequences of their own
decisions. 174 The Charter's directive is clear: the use of force is prohib171 Robert Houston, A Stunning Inarticulateness, THE NATION, July 4, 1981, at 15; cf
GRIFFIN, supranote 41, at 29:
It is June 25, 1950. Massive forces from the north have crossed the South Korean border. General MacArthur delays sending word to Washington ....As he Foesjust to the
edge, and then just over the edge, of his legal powers, he is something like an acrobat,
leaning over an abyss of space ....Imagining myself in the General's place, Ijust begin
to perceive the outlines of his reasoning.
172 See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 68, at 1980 ("describ[ing] and defend[ing] a mode of
teaching that consciously attempts to bring theory, doctrine and practice together by structuring

'practical' experiences in a classroom setting").
173 See text accompanying notel26 127, supra.
174 1 am not suggesting that the ICJ does not or should not play an important role in the
development of ajurisprudence on the use of force. Still, the ICJ does not purport to establish
binding precedent. STAT. I.CJ art. 57. This permits-and it was intended to permit-significant
state autonomy.
For an account of the ways in which such intermediary mechanisms can facilitate war, see
GRIFFIN, supranote 41, at 153:
They garbed this violence in the cloak of legality. A mind separated from the depths of
itself cannot easily tell right from wrong. To this mind, the outward signs of law and
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ited, except in self-defense. The Charter leaves it to the states to give this
directive meaning, to apply it in concrete contexts. Use of Force enables
students to discover for themselves just how difficult and uncertain this
task is.
British psychoanalyst Jacqueline Rose has built on Freud's work on
war, including his famous correspondence with Einstein.175 She describes a strong correlation between the inability to tolerate ambiguity
and uncertainty and the willingness to go to war.176 Instead, in some
desperate, doomed quest for finality, certainty, and perfection, those who
cannot tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty project this internalized
conflict outward on to the enemy, who can then be destroyed with
relish. 177 "Hang on to failure, hang on to derision-a failure and
derision that would not invite a reactive triumphalism but pre-empt it-if
you want to avoid going to war," she concludes.178 Learning to talk about
law when we talk about war, and learning to tolerate the ambiguities and
inevitable frustrations in a classroom context, may help us "hang on to
failure."
Use of Force frees students from the constraints of foundationalism,
state rhetoric and "right answers." It gives them a sense of the immediacy and the vitality of international law, and invites them to join in its
ongoing development. 179 If we want a world of law, of "right" rather than
"might," Americans must begin talking about law when we talk about war.
Where better to begin this discussion than in law school classrooms? Use
of Force, like Carver's story, both initiates such discussions and transforms
those who enter into them.

order signify righteousness. That Himmler has such a mind was not unique in his generation, nor, I suspect, in ours.
175 JACQUELINE ROSE, WHY WAR?-PSYCHOANALYSIS, POLITICS, AND THE RETURN TO
MELANIE KLEIN 15 (1993); see Why War?, supranote 6.
176 See ROSE, supra note 175, at 21-28 (citing KARL VON CLAUSEwITZ, ON WAR (1832),
probably the most famous work on war, for its theory of "total," or absolute, war). Attitudes
toward raising children may both reflect and inform a culture's ability to tolerate ambiguity. Dr.
Daniel Schreber, the Dr. Spock of pre-war Germany, exemplified the approach of strict authoritarians. "Crush the will they write. Establish dominance. Permit no disobedience. Suppress everything in
the child." GRIFFIN, supranote 41, at 120 (emphasis in original).
177 ROSE, supranote 175, at 18-19.
178 Id. at 37.
179 I am not suggesting the creation, or emergence, of a new metanarrative. As Martti
Koskenniemi has observed, however:
[The use of force] creates difficulties for an agnostic legal rhetoric, denying its reliance
on anyparticular substance. Nonetheless, it challenges international lawyers to formulate andagree upon some very basic ideals of communal life, however tentative. Without this, it is hard to see how we might feel justified in looking beyond today's crisis
with any confidence in a shared future.
Martti Koskenniemi, The Future ofStatehood, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 397, 410 (1991). For a thoughtful
exploration of a liberal agenda, "in which states are the primary actors but are simultaneously
transparent and embedded in transnational society," see Anne-Marie Slaughter, The LiberalAgenda
For Peace: InternationalRelations Theory and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSN'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 419 (1994).

